Hamas, the Israeli siege, and the difficult choices ahead

By: Tallha Abdulrazaq

When Hamas first came to power after ousting Fatah forces intent on preventing their democratic rise to political prominence, they had never been so popular. For decades since the First Intifada, Hamas had been undermining the increasingly corrupt and collaborative Fatah party who dominated and ruled the PA (Palestinian Authority). While Fatah was busy embezzling public funds that should have gone into the education and health of Palestinians, Hamas was equally busy setting up small schools and clinics, further endearing themselves to the Palestinian people. Under the leadership of Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, Abdulaziz al-Rantisi, and other popular figures, Hamas portrayed themselves as champions of the common Palestinian, not linked with the corrupt underhandedness of Fatah and the PA, and also as a direct manifestation of the implacable and indomitable Palestinian urge to resist and fight Israeli occupation.

But what are the contemporary issues facing Hamas, especially in light of the Israeli siege and the ‘Arab Spring’ revolutions?

Hamas has been under constant political and military attack since it first came into being, but at no point has it faced a more difficult situation than now. After the assassinations of Sheikh Ahmad Yasin and al-Rantisi, Hamas has seemingly adopted a different strategy. Hamas shifted from being an effective non-participant political opposition to Fatah and their corrupt collaboration with Israel, to a strategy of attempting to assert direct political prominence and power over Palestinian legislation. For one, they have taken steps to legitimise themselves as a political force, not only on the domestic scene, but also on the international arena. They campaigned for, and took part in, a UN regulated Palestinian legislative election and they not only did well, but they actually won and technically became the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people.

Internationally, this was not appreciated by the so called pro-democracy West, as represented by the United States, the EU, and even Israel, all of whom chose to ostracise Hamas for daring to embrace democracy. Apparently sore after their defeat, Fatah took their collusion with Israel and the US one step further and planned to militarily assert their control over the Palestinian Territories, thereby instigating a coup against Hamas. This did not work out for Fatah, who were instead soundly and roundly defeated by Hamas fighters who subsequently expelled Fatah from the Gaza Strip for their treason. The above events, minus the subsequent and some might say excessively violent anti-Fatah crackdown, only served to increase Hamas’ popularity not only amongst the Palestinians but also the wider Arab and Islamic world. They saw Hamas as the mistreated underdog, who tried to play by the West’s rules only to get slapped in the face when they did what was asked of them.

After Fatah were neutralised as an effective political force in Gaza, Israel decided to besiege the Gazan population with the stated aim of minimising arms smuggling to Hamas. However, even basic necessities such as medicines and building materials like cement were prevented from entering, so beginning a long and dreadful siege that has seen the common Palestinian punished for having the apparent audacity to cast a vote for a party not hitherto approved by the US, the EU and Israel. However, it was not all doom and gloom for Hamas. Again, rather than alienating Hamas from the population, this manoeuvre only increased their legitimacy and further de-legitimised Fatah, who did nothing and, according to the Palestine Papers released by Aljazeera, even knew what the Israelis planned and remained silent. Still, Hamas began a series of fundamental changes to the way Palestinian society had existed up until then. It disarmed the vast majority of the population, ended blood feuds between Palestinian families, made pacts with other resistance factions, and even prevented the previously rampant kidnappings, with even a well televised and reported rescuing of BBC reporter Alan Johnston from the hands of terrorists.

Although the siege initially served only to galvanise the Palestinians in their support of Hamas, things are likely to be taking a different turn unless Hamas makes some rapid changes. Hamas recognised early on that a continued siege would not only cripple Gaza’s economy, but would also erode the morale of the Gazan people and so decided that it had to maintain a strong base of support and entrench itself within the key infrastructures and bureaucracies of Gaza. Whilst Hamas have the ‘Izz al-Deen al-Qassam Brigades – fervently loyal and committed to Hamas doctrine – to call upon for serious military operations against Israel, they do not have enough of them to police the near 1.7 million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. This compelled Hamas to hire anyone who was willing to don a uniform and pick up a gun to enforce peace and security, and this has obviously led to rampant corruption and even abuse of power by the local police forces. Considering the financial and military burden that is being inflicted upon Gaza – including the average citizen – the Hamas government has found it difficult to curb these police excesses as, frankly, they are reliant upon them and they have now become a powerful bureaucracy. This has led to Gazans resenting Hamas as they, just like anyone else, expect them as their government to protect them from such things. A possible solution is to scale down Qassam operations against Israel temporarily and have them oversee the police force. This would mean that they could nip any corruption in the bud before it occurs, and it would maintain their anti-corruption image.

Apart from the policing problem, there are also issues with Hamas doing their utmost to maintain party loyalty by providing ‘perks’ to those loyal to them. If you own an apartment or a house in Gaza, you had better make sure that you’re actually living there or have someone there on a permanent basis or else you might find that it has been requisitioned for ‘official’ purposes. This basically translates as Hamas officials giving their loyal supporters and their families’ real estate that does not actually belong to them. This is simply likely due to the fact that Hamas is finding it hard to pay their employees, and so they must find an alternative method of compensation for their troubles. Again, this has done nothing but harm to their image among everyday Gazans and, no matter how difficult, they should find alternate ways of keeping factional loyalty without reducing their support base that they are crucially reliant upon amongst the population.

Finally, Gazan society has experienced some unwelcome changes under Hamas’ rule. Women are actively discouraged from riding bicycles on the beach for some unknown reason, and they also cannot smoke shisha in public, even though it might be considered culturally unseemly even for men. Moreover, there also exists officially sanctioned interference with the private lives of the populace. The last thing a man taking his wife out to dinner wants to hear from a policeman hefting arrogance only a badge and a uniform can bring is, ‘Do you have a marriage certificate to prove that she’s your wife?’ This form of religious policing is also nothing to do with Islamic morality that teaches to mind one’s own business, unless there is a clear threat to the public and society. Even assuming that a person was having an extra-marital relationship; how does that affect anyone but them and perhaps their family? It clearly is not a threat to society at large, and any family issues arising from it can be dealt within those families inside the boundaries of the law, or in a court room itself to settle any disputes. The police should have nothing to do with investigating people’s private lives with religiously sanctioned, but not justified, voyeurism.

With the above in mind, it becomes clear that these fundamental problems have hurt Hamas’s standing amongst Palestinians. Not only that, but Palestinians are getting fed up with the divisive attitude amongst all the Palestinian factions, including Hamas and Fatah. Indeed, Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza held demonstrations calling for unity during March 2011. Unfortunately, these were hijacked and also violently suppressed by both Hamas and Fatah in their respective territories. Hamas could have handled this public frustration over a lack of Palestinian unity by allowing the demonstrators the freedom to demonstrate, particularly as the demonstrators had informed them that this was nothing to do with supporting Fatah, and everything to do with having Palestinians unite. Hamas could have portrayed themselves as being reasonable in the face of Fatah violence against Hamas members in the West Bank demonstrations, and further encouraged public fury to mount against Abbas and his government. Instead, they have become paranoid and see any demonstration as a potential attack against them, and so they crack down on all who don’t wear their colours. This has to change, as well as a public apology with the promise of an inquiry, for normal Palestinians to begin to take Hamas seriously again.

With the recent abduction and unforgivable murder of Italian activist Vittorio Arrigoni by Salafi terrorists in Gaza, Hamas have an opportunity to take advantage of the appalled reaction by Palestinians everywhere and bring those responsible to justice, as well as neutralising a potential threat to their rule on the way. This would certainly boost their credibility and then, with the aforementioned suggestions having been implemented, they need only to await the end of the Israeli siege to be able to claim a major political victory against Israel, further de-legitimise Fatah, and be able to restore Gaza’s economy and infrastructure. The Israeli siege could conceivably end very soon if the Rafah border crossing is restored to full operation in cooperation with the Egyptians. This could happen if a true Egyptian democracy that represents the will of the Egyptian people is born – and it may well do – as public opinion in Egypt is overwhelmingly against the siege on Gaza. Perhaps this will finally be Hamas’s ticket out; they need only to mend their relationship with their people, and victory is assured.